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This article presents an index of governance performance for Cook 
Islands for the period 1985 to 2005. Three dimensions of governance 
(rule of law, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality) are 
measured using various indicators. The constructed index indicates 
that Cook Islands’ governance performance improved between 1996 
and 1999 but stagnated from 2000 to 2005. The improvement was 
largely due to fiscal austerity measures resulting in better economic 
management, competition in the essential services sector, and an 
expansion of the private sector. The stagnation in the post 1999 period 
is largely attributable to increased political instability and rising 
corruption. The governance index provides a useful basis from which 
to monitor future changes in governance performance. 
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The importance of the relationship between 
state capacity and national economic 
progress has led to considerable research 
on the quantification of public sector 
capacity. While several measures of aspects 
of public sector capacity exist (for example, 
Index of State Credibility, Participatory 
Development and Good Governance, Corruption 
Perception Index, Competitiveness Rankings, 
the International Country Risk Guides, Civil 
Liberties and Political Rights and Index of 
Economic Freedom), the best known and most 
comprehensive quantification of governance 
performance is that by Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2003 and 2004). These 
researchers have produced measures of 
six dimensions of governance (voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence 
of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control 
of corruption) for over 200 countries for the 
years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 
2005 (World Bank 2006). Their indicators of 
these governance dimensions are based on 
several measures of people’s perceptions of 
governance in the countries and are drawn 
from multiple data sources.
Achieving and maintaining strong 
institutions and good governance have 
become issues of concern for many 
developing economies showing poor 
economic and social progress, including 
countries in the South Pacific region 
(Duncan and Chand 2002; Prasad 2003; 
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Duncan 2004). Saldanha (2004) has argued 
that the roots of governance problems in 
the Pacific are deeply embedded in political 
and social issues such as the structures 
of government, the quality of leadership, 
and the capacity of civil society to hold 
government accountable. In response to 
these concerns, the leaders of the Pacific 
Islands Forum countries have set achieving 
good governance as one of the four priority 
goals in the development of the Pacific 
Plan for the closer integration of the region 
(Forum Secretariat 2005).
In the past, the small Pacific island 
country of Cook Islands has been no 
exception in respect of poor economic 
and social progress and concerns about 
governance. A fiscal crisis in the 1990s led to 
a near collapse of the economy and a sharp 
decline in welfare. While remittances from 
emigrants was a source of relief for Cook 
Islanders—as they have been in the past 
(Hughes 2003)—the collapsing economy and 
decline in living standards led to a degree of 
disillusionment among aid donor countries 
and investors about the government’s 
capacity to manage. Fortunately, in this 
case, the fiscal crisis triggered substantial 
economic reforms.
This article reports the results of the 
construction of a governance index for Cook 
Islands to gauge the impact of the reform 
program on its governance and for use as a 
baseline for the measurement of governance 
performance in the future. This study is 
part of the ongoing Pacific Islands Good 
Governance Project at the University of 
the South Pacific, which has resulted in the 
construction of a governance index for Fiji 
(Gani and Duncan 2007) and several other 
Pacific Island countries (see Nagakawa, 
Duncan and Gani 2007).
Analytical framework and 
the selection of governance 
dimensions
In selecting the variables to be included 
in the governance index for Cook Islands, 
the analytical framework follows the now 
broadly agreed definitions of governance. 
While governance has been defined in 
different ways (see, for example, Polidano 
2000; Neumayer 2002; Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 2003, 2004), all definitions 
refer to much the same set of activities and 
issues—as noted by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2004). They include the process 
by which governments are selected and 
replaced; the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among 
them.
Our analysis of governance indicators 
is formulated within the framework of the 
‘new institutional economics’, a body of 
analysis generally identified as an attempt 
to extend the range of neoclassical theory by 
highlighting the importance of institutions 
that are fundamental to the effective 
functioning of market-based economies, such 
as law and order, property rights, contracts, 
and governance structures (Rutherford 
2001). Douglass North, the Nobel prize-
winning economic historian, has extensively 
emphasised the role of institutions in the 
process of economic progress (North 1990). 
Governance can be seen as the outcome of 
the effectiveness of a society’s institutions: if 
the institutions are appropriate and effective 
(enforced), the outcome should be good 
governance (Duncan 2003). It should be 
noted, however, that the roles of institutions 
and governance are yet to be formalised 
as part of the economic theory of growth 
(Duncan 2003). Thus, in the absence of a 
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formal theoretical relationship between 
governance and growth, the establishment 
of indicators of good governance lacks a 
coherent theoretical framework.
However, there is a growing body of 
empirical literature showing associations 
between what are believed to be measures 
of governance and economic performance. 
For example, see the writings of Besley 
and Burgess (2003) on the impact of 
institutional reforms on expanding 
household opportunities; Barro (2001), on 
the relationship between the rule of law 
and growth; Chong and Calderon (2000), 
on the relationship between institutional 
quality and income distribution; Safavian, 
Graham and Gonzalez-Vega (2001), on 
the impact of regulatory intrusion into 
enterprise activities; Djankov et al. (2002), 
on the relationship between regulation of 
entry and corruption; Fischer et al. (2001), 
on bureaucratic inefficiency and financial 
mismanagement; and Gausch and Hahn 
(1997), on regulation and its undesirable 
economic consequences.
Given that governance outcomes 
are many and varied, we have chosen 
governance dimensions that largely reflect 
the definitions of governance as proposed by 
Kaufmann et al. (2003 and 2004), Neumayer 
(2002) and Polidano (2000). Three core 
governance dimensions are formulated: the 
rule of law, government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality. Each of these dimensions 
of governance has several sub-dimensions. 
Indicator variables that are believed to 
directly or indirectly capture or reflect these 
sub-dimensions of governance are used in 
their measurement (see Appendix Tables).
The justification for the selection of 
governance dimensions, sub-dimensions 
and indicators used in the construction of 
the governance index for the Cook Islands 
has been extensively discussed in earlier 
work (see Gani and Duncan 2004; Duncan et 
al. 2004; Gani and Duncan 2007). We provide 
here only a brief discussion of our choice 
of core dimensions and sub-dimensions 
contributing to the governance index. 
Several indicators were chosen to capture 
each of the sub-dimensions (see Appendix 
Tables).
The rule of law addresses the interactions 
between citizens and the institutions that 
assist in governing these interactions and 
is comprised of four sub-dimensions: 
political freedom, political stability, judicial 
effectiveness and media independence. As 
regards the influence of these sub-dimensions 
on the rule of law, when citizens enjoy 
political freedom they can use that freedom 
to exercise a check on the way that the 
government runs the nation’s affairs. Political 
instability may mean that the governing 
regime is vulnerable and is reluctant to see 
that the rule of law is enforced. A strong, 
independent judiciary enforces sound and 
fair observance of the rule of law. Media 
independence can also influence the rule of 
law by, for example, revealing information 
and thereby helping to enforce transparency 
and accountability. Civic involvement in 
government through newspapers, television, 
radio, and the internet can have an important 
bearing on government responsibility as 
people can voice their concerns and influence 
government performance. Unelected 
community organisations also become 
involved in the scrutiny of government 
through the media—strengthening the 
accountability of governments (Bardhan 
2002).
The second core dimension, government 
effectiveness, captures the state’s ability 
to develop and implement sound policies, 
efficiently deliver public goods and services, 
and enforce rules uniformly. Three sub-
dimensions were chosen to reflect this 
aspect of governance: bureaucratic efficiency, 
economic management, and corruption. 
Bureaucratic efficiency and good economic 
management practices can promote speedy 
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progress in nation building and society’s 
welfare. However, corruption in the public 
sector in its various forms can negatively 
impact on government effectiveness. The 
abuse of public power for private benefit can 
arise in many ways, for example, nepotism 
(meaning services are not provided as well 
as they might otherwise be), the ‘grand 
corruption’ that usually takes place through 
public works processes, and as a result of 
intense governmental regulation, which can 
lead to firms or individuals bribing public 
officials.
The third core dimension, regulatory 
quality, refers to the extent to which 
government policies promote or inhibit 
market activity and is measured here 
by two sub-dimensions: the strength of 
financial institutions and the extent of 
competition. Safavian et al. (2001) argue 
that regulatory intrusion into enterprise 
activities may be manifested in a variety 
of forms: obstacles to entry (permits and 
licenses); repressive, unpredictable and 
arbitrary taxation; required compliance 
with wide-ranging, superfluous statutes 
and regulations; and significant statutory 
power given to regulatory officials charged 
with monitoring and enforcing compliance 
among firms. Regulations that are costly to 
firms or people can induce bribes or other 
lobbying activities to bring about changes 
or, at least, waivers of the regulations in 
question. Regulatory intrusion is notable 
for its various negative effects including less 
democratic government, corruption, and 
development of informal activity (Djankov 
et al. 2002) and deterrence of domestic and 
foreign investors (Fischer et al. 2001).
Approach
The governance index for the Cook Islands 
is based on computations derived at three 
different levels. As noted earlier, the index 
is made up from three core dimensions: 
rule of law, government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality. The indices for each of 
the three core dimensions are computed 
from their sub-dimensions. In turn, each 
sub-dimension is mostly computed from 
several indicators, hereafter referred to as 
sub-dimension indicators.
The governance index, together with 
the core dimensions, sub-dimensions and 
sub-dimension indicators are measured 
numerically within the range zero to 1.0. The 
interpretation of this zero to 1.0 range is that 
a value closer to zero indicates a lower level 
of achievement. Since the governance index 
is constructed from annual data, expressing 
the index numerically allows governments 
and others to follow the changes in levels of 
governance easily.
All of the indicators used by the World 
Bank team in the construction of their 
governance indices are taken from surveys of 
perceptions of experts and opinion polls. In 
constructing governance indices for Pacific 
island countries, we felt expert opinions and 
opinion polls reflecting perceptions about 
governance in the small Pacific states would 
be difficult to obtain on a widespread and 
regular basis.1 Moreover, the subjectivity 
of indicators based on perceptions could 
be a source of resistance to developing 
economy governments accepting them as 
fair evaluations of their governance quality 
(Knack 2002).
In contrast to the perceptions-based 
approach, the approach used here provides 
measures of governance quality that 
are almost entirely based on objective 
data, a substantial proportion of which 
is drawn from official statistics. The 
only exceptions are the use of Freedom 
House’s Freedom in the World and Freedom 
of the Press (Freedom House 2006a, 2006b) 
indicators. The approach we have adopted 
intends there to be annual updates of the 
governance measures and for the indices 
to be comparable across the countries. 
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With this information, Pacific governments 
can have a measure of the changes in their 
governance performance over time and 
comparisons of their performance with that 
of their neighbours.
The reliability of official statistics in 
small developing countries is frequently 
problematic. Therefore, the margins of 
error in our method are not necessarily 
smaller than those of the perception-based 
indicators. However, given the limitations 
on obtaining perceptions-based information 
for small developing countries, such as the 
high cost of carrying out opinion surveys 
on a regular basis and the difficulty of 
obtaining a sufficient number of expert 
opinions, the method of using quantitative 
proxy indicators is believed to be a viable 
alternative and one that will improve as 
the generation of statistics improves in the 
region.
The appropriateness of the chosen 
indicators becomes a very important issue. 
That is, do they measure what they are 
intended to measure? Availability and 
timeliness of data became very important 
considerations in choosing our indicators. 
While one can think of indicators that would 
be good measures of the sub-dimensions 
chosen, very often these kinds of data are 
not available. For example, the backlog 
of court cases could be a good measure of 
the effectiveness of the courts. However, 
these kinds of data are rarely available and 
certainly not on an annual basis. Therefore, 
in many cases we had to think of proxies 
that could indirectly reflect what we are 
trying to measure.
So far 23 variables have been chosen as 
measures or proxies for the sub-dimensions 
(see Appendix Tables). Once data was 
collected for each indicator, it was expressed 
in index form. In calculating the various 
indices, we adopt the arithmetic formulae 
used in earlier work on Fiji (Gani and 
Duncan 2004, 2007). Several of our sub-
dimension indicators are benchmarked 
against a sample of Pacific Island countries 
where the same indicators are used to 
compute the governance indices (see 
Nagakawa, Duncan and Gani 2007). The 
usefulness of this form of benchmarking 
of performance indicators has been noted; 
for example, Lall (2000:1,520) has said that 
‘benchmarking national economies is an 
important tool for policymaking’. In the 
construction of the governance index for 
Fiji, Gani and Duncan (2004, 2007) provide 
arguments for adopting benchmarking.
Data and sub-dimension 
indicators
For nearly all sub-dimensions of governance, 
several indicators were selected to reflect 
achievement in that area. As regards 
the rule of law core dimension, for the 
sub-dimension political stability three 
indicators were chosen: regime turnover, 
military expenditure, and number of parties 
constituting government. The frequency of 
government change and number of political 
parties in a government could be seen as 
useful proxies of political stability; although 
a government able to hold power for a 
long time may become more authoritarian. 
Expenditure on the military may not 
appear an obvious choice as a proxy for 
political stability (instability). However, 
our reasoning is that in small countries the 
military is more often than not used for 
political purposes and therefore the stronger 
it is the more likely it will be to weaken the 
rule of law.
For the sub-dimension judicial 
effectiveness, the share of public expenditure 
on the judiciary was the only measure 
available to reflect the health of the judiciary. 
For the sub-dimension media independence, 
the measures used were the number of 
television and radio receivers per 1,000 
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inhabitants. We also included expenditure 
on crime as a sub-dimension of the rule of 
law. This was measured by expenditure on 
crime prevention and detection.
The core dimension government 
effectiveness has three sub-dimensions: 
bureaucrat ic  e ff i c iency,  economic 
management and the extent of corruption. 
Bureaucratic efficiency is measured by 
three measures: taxes on incomes, profits 
and capital gains as a share of total revenue, 
budget overruns, and the share of expenditure 
on repairs and maintenance. The bureaucracy 
is seen as efficient if it is able to ensure 
compliance in income tax collection. 
The frequency of budget overruns does 
not need much justification as a measure 
of government effectiveness, however, 
the share of expenditure on repairs and 
maintenance may not be so obviously a 
measure of government effectiveness. 
The rationale for choosing this variable 
as an indicator was that Pacific governments 
find it very difficult to budget for repairs 
and maintenance—as aid donors will 
readily acknowledge.
Economic management is measured 
by three variables: central government 
expenditure, the terms of office of the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Finance, and the share of import duties 
in tax revenues. The extent of corruption 
is captured by government consumption 
expenditure, economic services expenditure, 
and subsidies as a share of total government 
expenditure. These are all rather indirect 
measures of economic management, which 
is a difficult government attribute to 
Table 1 Cook Islands governance index, 1985–2005
  Rule of law Government Regulatory Governance 
  index effectiveness index quality index index
1985 0.373 0.056 0.002 0.144 
1986 0.393 0.066 0.182 0.214 
1987 0.387 0.069 0.110 0.189 
1988 0.386 0.116 0.332 0.278 
1989 0.384 0.113 0.414 0.304 
1990 0.399 0.116 0.461 0.325 
1991 0.407 0.106 0.288 0.267 
1992 0.421 0.152 0.486 0.353 
1993 0.377 0.152 0.425 0.318 
1994 0.381 0.111 0.402 0.298 
1995 0.432 0.197 0.281 0.303 
1996 0.409 0.163 0.381 0.318 
1997 0.488 0.288 0.517 0.431 
1998 0.421 0.287 0.677 0.462 
1999 0.389 0.507 0.736 0.544 
2000 0.441 0.372 0.777 0.530 
2001 0.334 0.452 0.812 0.533 
2002 0.428 0.408 0.830 0.555 
2003 0.489 0.385 0.760 0.545 
2004 0.477 0.451 0.735 0.554 
2005 0.480 0.463 0.730 0.558
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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measure. The justification for choosing these 
indicators and the other indicators detailed 
below will not be discussed but can be found 
in our earlier work (Duncan et al. 2004).
The core dimension regulatory quality 
includes two sub-dimensions: the strength 
of financial institutions and the extent of 
competition. Three indicators measure the 
strength of financial institutions: money and 
quasi money, the contract intensive money 
ratio, and the output of finance and business 
services. The extent of competition is 
measured by telephone mainline connection 
waiting lists and the share of the private 
sector in GDP.
Results
Cook Islands’ governance performance has 
improved significantly since 1985 (Table 1 and 
Figure 1). Significant changes in the index are 
the sharp decline in 1991, the even sharper 
improvement in the 1997–99 period, and the 
lack of change over the 2000–05 period. These 
changes are explained below with respect to 
the changes in the core dimensions.
The rule of law index
The rule of law index improved very 
slightly up to 1992 but then declined in 
1993 to reach almost the same level as in 
1987 (Figure 2). The decline was the result 
of rising military expenditure. From 1994 to 
1997 the rule of law index improved as the 
result of an increase in the number of parties 
constituting government (only one during 
1990–93). The increased number of parties 
is seen as representing a wider collective 
voice and so a sign of better governance. 
Also, military expenditure as a share of total 
government expenditure fell from 7.2 per 
cent in 1993 to 5 per cent in 1997, indicating 
more productive use of public funds.
Cook Islands has undergone many 
changes of government over the past decade. 
Between 1999 and 2002, the government 
changed five times. Despite the increased 
Figure 1 Cook Islands governance index, 1985–2005
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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political instability, the rule of law index 
rose sharply to a peak of 0.49 in 2003. Several 
factors contributed to this improvement. 
First, the share of military expenditure fell. 
Second, the number of independent parties 
holding parliamentary seats increased from 
none in 1999 to three for the years 2000 
to 2004. Third, there were higher levels 
of achievement in media independence 
from 1999 as a result of increases in the 
number of television and radio broadcast 
receivers. The number of TV sets increased 
from 183 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1999 to 
233 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2004. Radio 
broadcast receivers increased from 244 per 
1,000 inhabitants in 1999 to 260 per 1,000 
inhabitants in 2003. These increases suggest 
wider diffusion of media and an increase 
in the media independence index. Fourth, 
more funds were allocated to the judiciary 
and crime prevention and detection during 
the 2001–03 period.
The government effectiveness index
The government effectiveness index 
improved steadily over the period from 
1985 to 1994, and then there was a sharp 
improvement between 1996 and 1999 
(Figure 3). The improvement during the 
earlier period was as a result of better 
economic management, with government 
expenditure declining as a share of GDP. 
The government expenditure share fell from 
53 per cent in 1985 to 38 per cent in 1994. The 
economic management sub-dimension also 
increased during this time. The government 
effectiveness index dipped in 1996 as 
the result of an increase in government 
expenditure to 45 per cent of GDP. However, 
from 1997 to 1999 the index rose sharply as 
the result of the fiscal austerity measures 
adopted in the comprehensive economic 
reform program (increased tax revenues, 
declines in budget overruns, and declines in 
expenditure on repairs and maintenance). 
Figure 2  Cook Islands rule of law index, 1985–2005
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The government expenditure index peaked 
in 1999. At that time the share of government 
expenditure in GDP stood at 34.4 per 
cent: its lowest level during the 1985–2005 
period. Our results for the corruption 
sub-dimension point to corruption being 
on the rise between 1999 and 2002. A 
major contributor has been the increase in 
government subsidies.
The regulatory quality index
Cook Islands’ regulatory quality index 
shows excellent improvement over the 
sample period, except for dips in 1987, 
1991, 1993–95, and a recent slight decline 
over 2003–05 (Figure 4). The index declined 
sharply over the period 1993–95 due to a 
decline in money and quasi money as a share 
of GDP. From 1995 to 2002, however, the 
index rose strongly. This very good progress 
was largely attributed to an increase in 
competition, mostly in the services sector, 
as privatisation of government business 
enterprises took place. The private sector 
share of GDP increased from 45 per cent in 
1995 to 71 per cent in 2002. However, there 
has been a slight downturn in the regulatory 
quality index since 2003. This is due to a 
decline in the private sector share of GDP 
from 71.6 per cent in 2002 to 67.2 per cent 
in 2005.
Limitations
As noted previously, construction of 
the governance index involves arbitrary 
decisions with regards to the choice of core 
dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators. 
Moreover, data limitations place severe 
restrictions on the kinds of indicators that 
can be included in the index if we are 
to update it on an annual basis. For this 
reason some very indirect indicators of the 
sub-dimensions have been included and 
people will have very different views about 
whether these indicators measure what we 
Figure 3 The government effectiveness index, 1985–2005
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4 The regulatory quality index, 1985–2005
are using them to measure. Ideally, in many 
cases we would prefer to be able to use other 
indicators.
Then there are the limitations of the 
data itself. In the Pacific, data is often of 
poor quality. Further, the data used may 
have been affected by exogenous variables; 
for example, the variation in government 
expenditures arising from shocks such as 
natural disasters.
Subject to data availability, future 
updates of the governance measures will 
include more suitable indicators. Our 
philosophy on the construction of composite 
indices such as these is ‘the more [indicators] 
the merrier’. That is, additional indicators 
will be included if it is believed that they 
contain some useful information about 
the quality of that particular governance 
dimension. Ultimately, we can remove 
indicators that do not contain any additional 
information through statistical techniques 
such as Principal Components.
Conclusion
The governance index developed for the 
Cook Islands is made up of three core 
dimensions of governance, with each 
dimension measured in terms of several 
sub-dimension indicators. The aggregate 
governance index is based on 23 individual 
measures drawn from various sources for 
the period 1985 to 2005. The results  show 
that Cook Islands’ governance has improved 
considerably since 1985; however, since the 
rapid improvement in the 1996–99 period 
resulting from the economic reform program, 
there has been stagnation in the index.
The governance indicators developed 
here should be useful for monitoring changes 
in the quality of governance for the Cook 
Islands and thus provide valuable information 
for a range of stakeholders: policymakers, aid 
donors, investors, and society as a whole. 
They will give indications of where changes 
are taking place and where opportunities 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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for improvement lie. Overall, the index 
constructed appears to be consistent with the 
economic and political developments in the 
country during this period.
It is should be noted that the governance 
index has limitations that are largely to 
do with data availability and the choice 
of indicators. The choice of governance 
dimensions is also arbitrary and arguments 
over the choices made are probably 
inevitable. Some of the indicators used 
are quite indirect proxies and may not be 
what we are trying to capture. Bearing 
these limitations in mind, our intention 
is to continue to revise and improve the 
indicators on an annual basis—hopefully 
with the assistance of improved data and 
improved availability of data.
Note
1   In Kaufmann et al. (2006), governance indices 
for most of the Pacific countries included 
are calculated from a very limited number 
of source indicators, except for Papua 
New Guinea. A majority of the indices are 
derived from three source indicators or less. 
The statistical viability of the method used 
by Kaufmann et al. (2006) depends on the 
independence of source indicators (that is, 
those who were surveyed in a particular 
exercise do not refer to other indicators). This 
might be a problematic assumption for small 
island countries.
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Appendix Table 1 Rule of law (variable measures and sources of data)
Governance dimensions and  Measures Data sources 
indicators  
Political stability
 Regime turnover Number of times governing  Cook Islands 
  regime changed in each year Electoral Office
 Military expenditure Military expenditure as percentage ADB 2004 
  of central government expenditure 
 Number of parties constituting  Number of parties constituting The Report of Royal 
 the government the government Commission of  
   Political Review  
   (1998). For 2000–04,  
   pers. comm. Mr Tevai  
   Matapo, former 
   Commissioner of  
   Police, Raratonga
 Number of independent parties Share of independent parties in  As above 
  parliamentary seats 
Judicial effectiveness
 Share of expenditure on  Expenditure by the Ministry of  Cook Islands 
 the judiciary Justice as a percentage of total  Government Budget  
  expenditure estimates
Media independence
 Television broadcasting receivers Television broadcasting receivers  UNESCAP 2004. 
  per 1,000 inhabitants Years 2000 to  
   2004 are authors’  
   estimates
 Radio broadcasting receivers Radio broadcasting receivers  As above 
  per 1,000 inhabitants
Expenditure on crime
 Crime prevention Expenditure on crime prevention  Cook Islands 
  as a share of total government  Government Budget 
  expenditure estimates
 Crime detection Expenditure on detection, prosecution As above 
  and apprehension as a share of total  
  government expenditure
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Appendix Table 2 Government effectiveness (variable measures and sources of data) 
Governance dimensions and 
indicators
Bureaucratic efficiency
 Taxes on income profits and  
 capital gains 
 Budget overruns 
 
 Expenditure on repairs  
 and maintenance 
Economic management
 Central government  
 expenditure 
 Terms of office of the  
 Permanent Secretary of  
 Ministry of Finance 
 Import duties share in  
 tax revenue
Extent of corruption
 Government consumption  
 expenditure 
 Economic services expenditure 
 Subsidies as share of total  
 government expenditure
Measures 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains as percentage of 
total taxes
Gross deficits as a percent of 
GDP 
Expenditure on repairs and 
maintenance as a percentage of 
total expenditure
Central government 
expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP
Terms of office of the 
Permanent Secretary of 
Ministry of Finance 
Import duties as a percentage  
of tax revenue
Government consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of 
total expenditure
Economic services as a 
percentage of total expenditure
Subsidies as a percentage of 
total government expenditure
Data sources 
For years 1985–96, UNESCAP 
2003. Statistics Cook Islands 
for years 1997–04.
For years 1985–01 ADB 2004 
and Statistics Cook Islands for 
years 2002 and 2003.
ADB 2004 
 
ADB 2004 
 
Cook Islands Government 
Budget estimates. 1998 Mr 
Edward Drollet and 1999–
2004 Mr K.C. Carr 
Statistics Cook Islands
 
Statistics Cook Islands 
 
ADB 2004 
Statistics Cook Islands
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Governance dimensions and 
indicators
Strength of financial institutions
 Money and quasi money
 
 Contract intensive money ratio
 Output of finance and business  
 services 
 
Extent of competition
 Telephone connections 
 
 
 Private sector growth
Measures 
Money and quasi money (M2) 
as a percentage of GDP
Contract intensive money ratio
Real gross output of finance and 
business services as a share of 
GDP 
Telephone mainline connection 
waiting list (thousands) 
 
Gross output of corporate 
enterprise as a share of GDP
Data sources
 
ADB 2004 
Authors’ calculation
For years 1985–94, UNESCAP 
2003. For years 1985–2003, 
Statistics Cook Islands (Table 
2.5).
Pers. comm. Mr Stuart 
Davies, Chief Executive 
Officer, Telecom Cook Islands, 
January 2005
Statistics Cook Islands (Table 
2.3)
Appendix Table 3 Regulatory quality (variable measures and sources of data)
